

During the course of a conversation, [redacted]
had the following to say about his [redacted] contacts [redacted] with [redacted] 25X1
Soviet officials attending the International Conference on the Detection of
Nuclear Weapons Tests which opened at Geneva, Switzerland, on 1 July 1958.

1. "From my talks with them (Russians) in the last week or so, I
don't think a single one had any advance ideas that this business in China
would flare up. They all told me they had not expected it. It was their
idea that after the Khrushchev visit to China, things would be pretty quiet.
They all seem worried about it and I get the impression they are almost as
baffled by the Chinese communists as you or I. I also had a chance to talk
to one of the Chinese communists who are around here. It is not like talking
to a Russian, I assure you. This man spoke as if he had rehearsed his lines.
It was the kind of talk you would have gotten from a Russian Bolshevik in
the twenties; all the stuff about world revolution, imperialist encirclement,
etc.

2. "I haven't met a Russian in some years who has talked that way.
The ones with whom I have been in contact for a long time don't even bother
to use such terms. As a matter of fact, I do not recall once in the last
year or so where a Russian with whom I have had contact has talked about
anything but his particular job and how he wants to see his country do better
things for him and the Russian people. There wasn't one reference to doctrine.
I ask them if they think that the Chinese will be rash enough to try something
like an invasion. They say they, themselves, do not know. They also

say they have been discussing that particular point among themselves but nobody has any answers.

3. "Of course, the U.S. comes in for a lot of the blame in the present Chinese attitude. But I have had the impression for some time that the Russians themselves are a good deal responsible. It suited them (Russians) to have the Chinese communists excluded, for example, from the United Nations. The Chinese had to come to Moscow, so to speak, to carry many things for Peking in the international forums.

4. "We have also been talking about the work that went on here at Geneva about an inspection system to detect nuclear explosions. The Russians here are well satisfied. I think they were pleased they managed to get on so well with the American technicians. Of course they were given prior instructions to try to make a general deal. It suited the men at the working level, however, to be able to get things done in such a business-like way, without the handcuffs of complete political direction. They even laughed about the Middle East crisis. They said the Americans were in trouble on that one, but that they, the Russians, could easily get into such trouble themselves. I asked, why? They said the Russians were demanding to be recognized as a Middle East factor. If that happens, the Soviet Union would have to underwrite a lot of projects.

5. "It will not be the same thing, one of them pointed out to me, as in selling lots of obsolete armaments on a credit and barter basis. They are, in their way, giving credits and merchandise they could use to better advantage at home. I found many complaints recently among the men I know

about making contributions to other countries. They said the idea was fine and noble, but charity should begin at home. These men, especially the technicians I have come to know, are as interested in creature comforts and the futures of their families as any western European.

6. "I find this fascinating. It may have existed at the time of my first real contact with them [redacted] It was not shown then because, I suppose, they did not dare. Now they speak about it openly. Khrushchev, by the way, as I may have told you before, is not a dearly beloved character to these men. They have clear contempt for him for his lack of intellectual polish and for his off-the-cuff statements. In private talks I have heard him compared, by many of them, to western politicians who are trying to make headlines all the time.

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7. "But the one big thing now is they are very worried about the situation with the Chinese. I also asked if they thought the reports of Russians giving Chinese atomic weapons were true. All of those I asked said they didn't know of their own knowledge, but they did not think so. They did think the Chinese communists might soon develop an atomic bomb of their own. Some of them told me the Chinese who had been training under Soviet supervision referred too often to the day when 'People's China' would have its own atomic arsenal. As I say, I have a distinct impression that the Russians I know are quite unhappy with the present state of affairs in Communist China."

End of Message

6P10-6970


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

12 SEP 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Andrew J. Goodpaster
The White House

Attached is a report wanted.



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I think you might find it
interesting.

SIGNED

C. P. Cabell
General, USAF

Acting Director

O/DOCT:JMC:am 12 Sep 58

Orig - Addressee

1 - A/DCI (via W.O. carrier)

✓ - ER

1 - JMC

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY) ~~SECRET~~ These lines